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INTRODUCTION

NFLATIONARY pressures on the American scene during

the past decade have had substantial effects in almost
every field of endeavor. Prices have experienced an almost
jet-propelled rise. Labor unions have attempted to keep in
step with or ahead of price rises by seeking wage increases
for their members through the medium of the collective bargaining processes. The five-cent subway fare-even the traditional five-cent cigar-all these are relics of a past era.
Nor has the ivory tower of the law been untouched by
these mundane financial considerations. Legal fees have
increased; salaries paid to young lawyers have reached
higher levels; and jury verdicts have soared, as many an inadequately insured defendant in a negligence case has discovered to his sorrow.'
t Member of the Faculty, St John's University School of Law.
t Law Assistant to Hon. Charles W. Froessel, Associate Judge of the Court
of Appeals of the State of New York.
I The courts themselves have taken cognizance of the rising price level in
evaluating the reasonableness of verdicts. Thus in sustaining a $45,000 verdict
in a personal injury action against a claim of excessiveness, a California
court stated: "The decreased purchasing power of the dollar renders unpersuasive the cases cited by appellants from the 1930's and earlier ...
'It does not follow that because a plaintiff 36 years ago received a none too
generous verdict, the award herein was too generous.'" Pederson v. Carrier
et al., 204 P. 2d 417 (Cal. App. 1949). See also Neddo v. State, 275 App. Div.
492, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 650 (3d Dep't 1949).
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It is the purpose of this article to bring into focus an
area of domestic relations law which has a direct relationship to this inflationary spiral. That is the area of the
separation agreement. Viewed solely as an economic instrument, a separation agreement entered into during the
nineteen thirties, when the dollar was worth much more
than it is today, may have become virtually obsolete in the
nineteen fifties. If the agreement was drawn during the
thirties or even the early forties and provided for fixed
periodic payments of so many dollars a week or a month,
without any "escalator" clauses 2 to take care of increases in
the husband's income and price rises, the chances are that
the agreement now provides a very inadequate income for the
support of the wife or the wife and children. While it may
be urged that a well drafted separation agreement will
have provided for such contingencies by means of an appropriate "escalator" clause, the answer is that, unfortunately,
many separation agreements drawn ten or fifteen years ago
did not contain such a provision for one reason or another.
Indeed, such a provision is lacking even in some of those
drawn today. Lawyers have not always been quick to appreciate the impact of sky-rocketing index numbers.
The present investigation will seek to show the historical
background of inadequacy and changed conditions as a
ground for avoiding separation agreements, will treat the
major decisions which have dealt with the subject in New
York, and will strive to give a reasonably" accurate picture
of the present status of the law. Emphasis will be upon the
Court of Appeals decisions on the subject, but some attention will also be given to significant lower court holdings.
2 The term "escalator clause" is used here to describe a provision in the
separation agreement which insures the wife of an increase in her support
allowance when the husband's salary and/or her need increases. For example,
a separation agreement might be so drawn as to provide $50 a week as a minimum support allowance, with a further proviso that $7 a week additional be
added to the $50 figure for each $1,000 of increase in the husband's annual
salary over his salary at the time the agreement is made. The term also, of
course, embraces any downward adjustments which may be provided for in
given contingencies, such as a decrease in the husband's income.
The general problem analyzed in this article has not as yet received much
discussion from the text writers. However, for some enlightenment, see
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS § 7(XIX) et seq. (1937)
and GROSSMAN,
NEw YORK LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATrONS § 429 et seq. (1947).
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This field is a very difficult one in which to generalize,
and for that reason it has been found necessary to set forth
the facts of the cases discussed in considerable detail, and
also in some instances to quote from the language of the
opinions. It is easy to err in analyzing the holdings in a
very fluid legal realm by divorcing judicial syntax from
factual context, and the rather extensive fact statements
used herein are deliberately designed as antidotes to that
tendency. Inclusion of the factual backgrounds, it is hoped,
will also permit the reader to formulate his own conclusions
as to the state of the law, rather than being led necessarily
to accept the authors' views.
II.

EARLY HOLDINGS

Galushav. Galusha 3 is the starting point in any analysis
of this field. In that case the contract between the parties
was made after an actual separation and through the intervention of a trustee. By its terms the husband agreed to
give the wife $5,000 for the purchase of a house and lot,.
l1,000 for medical expenses, some articles of personal property, and, in addition thereto, to pay to the trustee for her
benefit 5100 monthly during her natural life. On the part
of the wife and the trustee it was covenanted to "accept such
payments in full payment and satisfaction, for the maintenance and support of said [wife] 'during her natural life...
and to save [the husband] harmless from the payment of all
sums of money for or on account of the full support, maintenance, medical attendance, and any and all expenses, legal
or otherwise ... " 4 of the wife.
Thereafter the wife obtained a divorce on the ground
of adultery, and in the divorce action the trial court
compelled the husband to pay such additional amount over
and above that provided in the agreement as to it seemed
just. The sum fixed was 3,750 which the husband was
3 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114 (1889).
Some of the facts referred to in
the text are taken from the opinion in a subsequent appeal in a later suit between the same parties, Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272 33 N. E. 1062

(1893).
4 116 N. Y. 635, 642, 22 N. E. 1114, 1115 (1889).
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ordered to pay annually as permanent alimony. In disapproving the result reached by the trial court and in holding the separation agreement to be a complete bar to such
an award, the Court of Appeals used the following oft-quoted
language:
We have, then, a valid tripartite agreement .... The plaintiff did
not, in her complaint, ask, as a part of the relief, that the separation
agreement be set aside. She did not allege that it had been obtained
fraudulently or by means of duress. In no way whatever was its
validity attacked ....
The authority conferred upon the court ...

is not so broad and

comprehensive as to admit of a construction conferring upon the
court power to .

.

. arbitrarily set aside a valid agreement, because

in the judgment of the court one of the parties agreed to accept from
the other a less sum of money than she ought.
. . . this authority to protect the wife in her means of support was
not intended to take away from her the right to make such a settlement as she might deem best for her support and maintenance. The
law looks favorably upon and encourages settl6ments made outside
of courts between parties to a controversy. If, as in this case the
parties have legal capacity to contract, the subject of settlement is
lawful and the contract without fraud or duress is properly and
voluntarily executed, the court will not interfere. 5
It soon became evident, however, that in certain situations the court would "interfere." 6 Thus in lungerford v.
7
,tungerford
an action was brought to set aside an agreement under which the wife, in consideration of $1,000 and
some articles of household furniture, agreed to relinquish
all claims upon the husband for support during his life and
upon his estate after his decease. It appeared that the husband, prior to the execution of the agreement, had maltreated
the wife and had inflicted physical violence upon her to such
5 Id. at 645, 22 N. E. at 1116.
6 In the Galusha case itself, on a subsequent appeal in an action to open

-the judgment of divorce and to adjudge the separation agreement invalid, it
was held that the complaint stated a cause of action. The question of improvi.dence was not directly involved in the subsequent appeal. However, the court
held the complaint good on the basis of allegations that the execution of the
agreement was procured by coercion and duress on the part of the husband.
See 138 N. Y. 272, 278, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893).
7 161 N. Y. 550, 56 N. E. 117 (1899). See also Winter v. Winter, 191
N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (1908).
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an extent that she could have successfully maintained against
him an action for separation; that, while there was no express fraud or duress, still the agreement was executed by
the wife inadvisedly and improvidently as the result of such
ill-treatment; and that the provisions for the wife's support
were entirely inadequate for the purpose and were not suitable or equitable, considering the husband's means.
The court pointed out that a contract between husband
and wife was void at law and could be upheld solely in
equity, and even there only when the provision for the maintenance of the wife was suitable and equitable," and it
affirmed, with little further discussion, the setting aside of
the agreement.
Next to consider the problem, this time from a somewhat
different angle, was Chamberlain v. Cuming decided by the
Appellate Division, Second Department, and affirmed without opinion in the Court of Appeals.9 There it was held that
in a suit on a separation agreement the defendant husband
could not introduce evidence tending to show that his financial condition had materially changed since the making of
the agreement, that he had subsequently sustained business
reverses, and that he was no longer able to pay the sums due
under the contract. The Appellate Division, sustained by
the highest court, was of the opinion that the evidence sought
to be elicited was wholly immaterial because a change in the
financial condition of the husband would not operate to relieve him from his obligation under the agreement. 10 Thus
8 Id. at 553, 56 N. E. at 118. Of course, under present law a contract between husband and wife is valid at law except that they may not contract "to
alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve the husband from his liability to
support his wife." N. Y. DoM. RE.. LAW § 51.
999 App. Div. 561, 91 N. Y. Supp. 105 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd wuthout
opinion, 184 N. Y. 526, 76 N. E. 1091 (1906).
10 Two later cases which involve analogous problems are Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N. Y. 13, 124 N. E. 91 (1919), and Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N. Y.
561, 100 N. E. 408 (1912). In the Johwon case the complaint alleged that
the wife signed the agreement, knowing that its terms were unjust and unfair,
because of the husband's cruel treatment, his undue influence, etc., and it asked
that the agreement "be set aside so far as it limits the plaintiff to the sum of
$25 per week . . . and that at least the sum of $3,000 a year be allowed to her
for life together with a sum to defray the counsel fees and expenses of this
action . . .

."

Id. at 565, 100 N. E. at 409.

The court held that it could not,

as requested by the wife, award counsel fees nor could it annul the allowance
provision and leave the rest of the agreement intact, thus substituting its de-
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'this case presented, the converse of the usual situation-

instead of the wife seeking an increase in the support allowance because of changed conditions, the husband sought a
decrease on the same ground.
III.

LATER DECISIONS

The principle of Hungerford v. Hungerford1 1 was re-

affirmed and given additional vitality in a well-known case
decided in 1921.12

There, after 22 years of marriage, the

parties separated. The husband agreed to pay the wife, who
was represented by counsel at the time, the sum of 8,400 for
her support and maintenance and in full satisfaction and
release of any right of dower in the husband's realty and of

any and all claims against him. The agreement also recited
that a division of personal property (household goods,
ornaments, etc.) theretofore made should not be questioned.
Some time later the wife brought an action to set aside
the agreement giving as one reason that the provision made
cision for the agreement of the parties as to the amount of the allowance. For
a still later case discussing a similar problem, see Carlson v. Carlson, 269 App.
Div. 21, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (4th Dep't 1945).
In the Stoddard case, the agreement provided: "In the event that there
should be any material change in the circumstances of either of the parties
hereto either party hereto shall have the right to apply to any court of competent jurisdiction for a modification of the provisions herein regarding the
amounts to be paid hereunder by the party of the first part (the husband) to

the party of the second part hereto (the wife)

."

227 N. Y. 13, 15, 124 N. E.

91 (1919). After making the stipulated payments for several years, the husband brought an action, alleging that his income had become greatly impaired
and that of his wife considerably increased, and that he was no longer able to
make the payments provided for, and praying in part that the amounts due under
the original terms of the agreement be reduced or that the separation agreement
be adjudged no longer in force. The court found the complaint did not state
a cause of action, saying at pages 20-1: "In the first place, the amount of
allowance for support . . . is so far an integral part of the agreement . . .
that I doubt whether it could be set aside without annulling . . . the entire
agreement. But beyond this the court cannot reform an agreement entered
into by parties by making a new agreement or provision for them in the place
of the one which they have adopted. (Hughes v. Cauning, 165 N. Y. 91, 96,
97.)"
11 161 N. Y. 550, 56 N. E. 117 (1899).
12 Tirrell v. Tirrell, 232 N. Y. 224, 133 N. E. 569 (1921).
In that case
McLaughlin, 3., dissented, stating: "It is not suggested that any fraud, deception or coercion was practiced upon her (the wife), or that she was deceived in. any vay as to defendant's financial condition, or as to the terms of
the agreement or release. She was the best judge of what she needed for
support. (Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. 462.)" Id. at 232, 133 N. E. at 571.

19501

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS

for her was inequitable and grossly inadequate in view of the
situation of the parties and the earning capacity and property interest of the husband. The Court of Appeals went
into an extended analysis of the rather comfortable financial
status of the husband at the time the agreement was made,
pointing out that the wife had at the time of the agreement,
and still had, no income or means of support except what
she received from the husband, and concluded that the agree3
ment should be set aside.'
A new element was injected into the picture with Gold4
man v. Goldman.1
There the wife obtained a divorce a few
weeks after the parties had entered into a separation agreement. The judgment in the divorce action, rendered in 1929,
incorporated the stipulations of the separation agreement.
Both the agreement and the judgment required that the husband pay the wife .21,000 annually and certain other stipulated special expenses. In 1938 Special Term modified the
provisions of the 1929 judgment so as to reduce the allowance
to 14,000 a year, the husband's income having declined
considerably. The Court of Appeals, after reaffirming the
rule of the two Galusha cases 'r (discussed sup ra), pointed
21 The court was of the view that "a suggestion that he [the husband] has
discharged the legal obligation resting upon him by providing substantially a
sum equal to his net income for one year, for the support of his wife during
her lifetime, and that such measure of support is fair, adequate and equitable,
is fallacious." Id. at 231, 133 N. E. at 571. Cf. Cain v. Cain, 188 App. Div.
780, 177 N. Y. Supp. 178 (4th Dep't 1919). See also Harding v. Harding,
203 App. Div. 721, 197 N. Y. Supp. 78 (4th Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 514,
142 N. E. 264 (1923), wherein the wife, seeking to set aside a separation agreement for fraud and inadequacy, attempted to examine the husband before trial
as to his financial condition for a number of years up to the time of trial. The
husband objected on the ground that the years after the execution of the agreement were immaterial inasmuch as the critical date for determining adequacy
or inadequacy was the date of the agreement. However, it was held that the
husband could be examined for all years up to the date of the trial. A case
in similar vein subsequent to the Harding decision is Rosenthal v. Rosenthal,
230 App. Div. 483, 245 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1st Dep't 1930). See also Brooklyn
Trust Co. v. Lester, 239 App. Div. 422, 267 N. Y. Supp. 827 (2d Dep't 1933).
At least one writer has expressed the view that the Harding case was
clearly wrong because the current finances of the husband are immaterial in a
suit to set aside a separation agreement and should not be the subject of an
inquiry. "The Harding case and its followers remain on the books to confuse
the law. A reversal by the Court of Appeals is sorely needed." Roberts, The
Validity and Utility of Separation Agreements in New York Law, 16 ST.

JoHN's L. REv. 185, 197 (1942).

14282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. 2d 265 (1940).
15 See note 3 supra.
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out that those cases did not decide the question presented,
and then held:
...

that the power of the court to direct a husband to make suitable

provision for the support of his, wife is complemented by the power
to annul, modify or vary the direction thereafter and that a party
invoking the power of the court to give such direction cannot be
heard to say that the direction so given is not subject to modification
thereafter.' 6
Thus the court decided that the direction as to support
payments in the 1929 judgment had to be read just as if it
included an express reservation that it might thereafter be
annulled, varied or modified, pursuant to court order. 7
16 282 N. Y. 296, 305, 26 N. E. 2d 265, 269 (1940). The court specifically
reserved the question of the extent to which the contractual obligation, of the
husband to pay the $21,000 might have been affected by the court's direction
to pay a lesser sum, stating at page 305: "We point out here that the direction of the court that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff a sum less than
he agreed to pay does not relieve the defendant of any contractual obligation.
The direction of the court may be enforced in manner provided by statute and
the plaintiff may still resort to the usual remedies for breach of a contractual
obligation if there has been such a breach, but we do not now decide whether
the parties intended that the contractual obligation of the defendant should survive where the court has modified a direction to the defendant to pay the sum
fixed by contract."
The scope of the Goldman decision on this point was subsequently explained in Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21, 38 N. E. 2d 114 (1941), where
Judge Finch declared that: "The decision in the Goldman case reaffirmed the
rule as announced in the cases of Galusho v. Galusha (116 N. Y. 635; 138
N. Y. 272, 274) that a decree or a subsequent order in a matrimonial action
does not destroy the agreement or deprive the parties of their rights thereunder." Id. at 26, 38 N. E. 2d at 116. The Schmelsel case itself decided that
where a separation agreement, incorporated in a separation decree, provided
for payments of $250 a month for the wife, Special Term had no right thereafter to increase the payments to $350 a month and allow counsel fees. However, since the agreement was free of any fraud or duress and no question of
inadequacy was involved, the case is only collateral authority on the proposition
under discussion in the present investigation.
17See also Fox v. Fox, 263 N. Y. 68, 188 N. E. 160 (1933). The statute
under which the court has the power to modify is Civil Practice Act § 1155
which provides: "The court, in the final judgment dissolving the marriage in
an action for divorce brought by the wife, may require the defendant to provide suitably for the education and maintenance of the children of the marriage, and for the support of plaintiff, as justice requires, having regard to the
circumstances of the respective parties; and, by order, upon the application of
either party to the action, and after due notice to the other, to be given in
such manner as the court shall prescribe, at any time after final judgment
whether heretofore or hereafter rendered, may annul, vary or modify such a
direction. . .

."

The above quoted words were in the statute at the time of

the Goldman case (supra note 16). Subsequent to that case, the following
additional language has been added: "Subject to the provisions of section
eleven hundred seventy-one-b the authority granted by this section shall extend
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Next link in the chain of decisions was Kyff v. Kyff, 18
wherein the husband pursuant to a separation agreement
paid the wife the lump sum of 53,000 "in full satisfaction for
all claim for support and maintenance of every kind." 19
Ten years elapsed, and then the wife sued for divorce. At
the trial it was established that the wife had expended the
entire $3,000, that her sole source of income consisted of a
salary of 10 a week which she earned as a waitress, and that
the husband's income was approximately $50 a week. Upon
these facts Special Term required the husband to contribute
$7 a week to the wife. It was held that the release executed
by the wife as a part of the separation agreement did not bar
the court from exercising its discretion to award alimony.
In this case the Court of Appeals, after pointing out
that under the law of New York a husband and wife cannot
contract to relieve the husband from the liability to support
his wife,20 attempted to draw a distinction between an agreement which seeks to "purchase exemption" for a husband
from his duty of support (such an agreement being forbidden
by law) and an agreement which tries only to determine the
"measure" of the support allowance (such an agreement
being a valid one). The distinction is difficult to draw, yet
important, and the exact language of the court is therefore
worthy of careful note. It stated:
*. . a wife may not voluntarily release her husband from his duty to
support her and neither may the husband for a consideration purchase exemption from that duty.... Nonetheless, where the husband
and wife agree upon the measure of the support which they deem
proper for the benefit of the wife, then the court will not compel the

to unpaid sums or installments accrued prior to the application as well as to
sums or installments to become due thereafter."
18286 N. Y. 71, 35 N. E. 2d 655 (1941).
19 Id. at 72, 35 N. E. 2d at 656.

20 This principle is established by the express language of Domestic Relations Law § 51. As illustrative of the recent interpretation of this section, see
Haas v. Haas, 298 N. Y. 69, 80 N. E. 2d 337 (1948). There a separation
agreement provided maintenance to the wife on condition that she refrain from
engaging in a business competitive with that of her husband. The agreement
was held void as an attempt to relieve the husband of his duty to support the
wife.

[ VOL. 25

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
husband to support the wife in a greater sum
agreed upon is plainly inadequate. 21

unless the amount

Having set up this dichotomy, the court then concluded that

the agreement before it was not a valid one "whereby the
husband and the wife have mutually agreed upon the scale on

which the husband shall support the wife," but rather a forbidden "attempt by the husband to purchase exemption from

his continuing duty" of support.22
Thus it is seen that the court was beginning to draw a
definite line of demarcation between a lump sum settlement

agreement which it tended to regard as an invalid purchase
of exemption from the duty of support, and a periodic payment agreement which it looked upon as a legitimate determination of the measure of the duty of support. This distinction was forcefully reiterated by Judge Desmond in a
1943 case

23

wherein he said:

the Galusha and Goldman cases had to do with agreements for
regular, substantial, periodic payments to the wives, representing
admeasurements and determinations, -in dollars, of the husbands'
continuing obligations to support their wives.... But an agreement
to pay, and a payment of, a lump sum to a wife in return for a release of the husband from all future liability for the wife's support,
is something quite different. By such an agreement the husband
does not recognize, and join with his wife in measuring, his persisting
liability to support her. In lump sum agreements, the husband buys
24
his release for a price.
...

However, the apparent symmetry in the earlier decisions

soon proved fanciful rather than real, when in Dolan v.
Dolan the Court of Appeals without opinion

Appellate Division, Third Department

26

25

affirmed the

which had per-

21286 N. Y. 71, 74, 35 N. E. 2d 655, 657 (1941). The Kyff case cited with
approval many of the prior authorities discussed heretofore in the text, including Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893); Hungerford v. Hungerford, 161 N. Y. 550, 56 N. E. 117 (1899); Tirrell v. Tirrell,
232 N. Y. 224, 133 N. E. 569 (1921); and Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y.
296,' 26 N. E. 2d 265 (1940).
22 286 N. Y. 71, 74, 35 N. E. 2d 655, 657 (1941).
23 Jackson v. Jackson, 290 N. Y. 512, 49 N. E. 2d 988 (1943).
24 Id. at 516, 49 N. E. 2d at 990. Similar language was used by Judge Fuld
in the later case of Haas v. Haas, 298 N. Y. 69, 72, 80 N. E. 2d 337, 339 (1948).
25 296 N. Y. 860, 72 N. E. 2d 603 (1947).
26 271 App. Div. 851, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (3d Dep't 1946).
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mitted an attack on a periodic payment settlement.= There
the agreement had been entered into in June, 1934 and
provided 60 a month for the support of the wife and two
children, aged seven and nine. At the trial the husband,
a lawyer, gave no figures as to his income during 1934, but
it appeared that in 1935 he started to work for the Federal
Government at 3,600 a year and that thereafter his salary
increased quite steadily over the years. During 1934 he
maintained an automobile. The evidence also showed that,
after the parties separated in 1934, the wife went to live in
New York City where an apartment cost her 140 a month;
food for herself and the children, 513 a week; clothing, 520 a
month; supplies, $10 a month; and medical and dental care,
510 a month. This made a total of over 130 a month or
more than twice the amount specified in the agreement. In
setting aside the agreement, the Appellate Division, whose
decision the Court of Appeals affirmed, made findings of fact
to this effect:
(1) At the time the agreement was made the amount agreed to be
paid the plaintiff for her support and that of the children of the
marriage was inadequate and improvident. (2) That subsequent to
the execution of the separation agreement the earnings and income
of the defendant have been substantially increased and are now suffident to justify the payment of a larger amount than provided for by
the separation agreement. 28

27 See in the same vein Rubinfeld v. Rubinfeld, 264 App. Div. 888, 35 N. Y.
S. 2d 781 (2d Dep't 1942), appeal dismnissed (non-final order), 289 N. Y. 838,
47 N. E. 2d 439 (1943), where the Appellate Division allowed an attack on
a periodic payment settlement which was to endure for five years, rather than
for life. That court stated: "The agreement between the parties was valid
as measuring the support to be provided by defendant for five years, but in so
far as the agreement purported thereafter to exempt him from his duty to
provide continuing support for plaintiff, it was invalid . . . (Kyff v. Kyff, 286
N. Y. 71, 73, 74). It is of no moment that in the case cited the money was
paid in a lump sum, while in the case at bar payment extended over a period
of years. In each case, the purpose was to exempt the husband from his continuing duty from the time of payment of the agreed amount."
See also Leeds v. Leeds, 265 App. Div. 189, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 515 (1st Dep't
1942), where it appeared that the payments of $27.50 a week might cease
altogether during the wife's lifetime, upon the death or marriage of the child,
or upon the child reaching its majority. The court was of the view that a
possible construction of the agreement was that the intention was unlawfully
the husband of the obligation to support his wife.
to relieve
28
Dolan v. Dolan, 271 App. Div. 851, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 70, 72 (3d Dep't 1946).
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Thus the high court sanctioned the annulment of a
separation agreement which was not an effort by the husband
to purchase exemption from his duty of support-at least
not in the same sense as a lump sum settlement is-but was
rather a measurement by the parties of the husband's duty
of support. In so doing the court modified the previous distinction between lump sum and periodic payment settlements, and recognized that even the latter could be attacked
upon a proper showing of inadequacy at the time of execution.
The most recent holding by the high court on this subject is Pomerance v. Pomerance.29 There the amended complaint alleged a separation agreement entered into in 1939
whereby the husband agreed to pay the wife $30 a week for
the support of herself and their daughter, then eight years
of age.30 It also alleged that at the time of the drawing
of the agreement the husband "claimed and stated" that his
gross annual income was $4,000, and that the wife accepted
the $30 a week "because of her destitute circumstances and
by reason of her weak, nervous and run-down condition,"
although insufficient and inadequate at that time for the
maintenance and support of her needs and those of the child.
The amended complaint further alleged that at the time the
wife signed the separation agreement she was in debt and
had been left without any funds whatsoever by the husband,
and that her poor physical and nervous condition was caused
by the husband's conduct towards her. It was also alleged
that the needs of the wife and daughter had materially increased since the signing of the agreement; that the allowance was now "totally insufficient and inadequate"; and that
the husband was now earning upwards of $25,000 a year.
Special Term dismissed the complaint. In dismissing,
Mr. Justice Walsh, a jurist who has made a particular study
of problems in the matrimonial field, wrote a comprehensive
opinion in which he made a thorough canvass of many of the
authorities which have been referred to heretofore in this
29271 App. Div. 1027, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 72 (2d Dep't 1947), aff'd, 301 N. Y.
254 (1950). See also 272 App. Div. 768, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (2d Dep't 1947).
30 For the complete text of the complaint see the Court of Appeals Record
on Appeal at folios 19-45.
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article.3 1 In the opinion he pointed out the distinctions
which the Court of Appeals had made between lump-sum and
periodic payment settlements and concluded that the complaint did not contain allegations sufficient to undermine a
periodic payment agreement, The Appellate Division reversed Special Term on the law, with a brief memorandum
opinion 32 and certified to the Court of Appeals this question:
Does the amended complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action? 33
The Court of Appeals answered the question in the
affirmative. 34 A closely divided court was of the view that
the complaint was adequate, while a minority argued vigorously to the contrary. In sustaining this pleading the court
apparently demonstrated that it was not going to require
very great specificity in alleging such a cause of action so
long as the pleading set forth ultimate facts tending to show
inadequacy at the time the agreement was made. The close
division in the highest court, with three justices apparently
agreeing with the disposition made by Justice Walsh at
Special Term, underscores the great difficulties involved in
drawing the line in these borderline cases.3 5
IV.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW

Recapitulating, we can see two opposed tendencies manifesting themselves in these decisions. One is the tendency
31Justice Walsh's opinion appears at folios 46-54 of the Court of Appeals

Record on Appeal.
For an excellent study of modem marriage problems see Mr. Justice
Walsh's article, Marriage and Civil Law, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 209 (1949),

which he describes as "an appeal to do the kind of basic thinking so necessary
in this vital aspect of our culture, indeed of the very life of our nation."
32271 App. Div. 1027, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 72 (2d Dep't 1947).
3 272 App. Div. 768, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (2d Dep't 1947).
34 301 N. Y. 254 (1950).
35 An earlier case similar in many ways to the Pomerance decision except
that it did not involve the question of the adequacy of a pleading was Perrin
v. Perrin, 140 Misc. 406, 250 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Sup. Ct. 1931). There the
husband who was a dentist was ill and unable to work. The parties entered
into a separation agreement which provided only a small sum for the wife's
support. Later the husband recovered his health and resumed his practice.
The court permitted the agreement to be set aside upon the somewhat novel
theory of mistake at the time of execution of the agreement, the mistake being
as to the precise state of the husband's health.
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to uphold the inviolability of all contracts, including separation agreements, once they are made. The other is the tendency to give to the separation agreement a unique character,
quite different from that of all other contracts, and to
recognize in it an interest of the state in the preservation in
full effect of the husband's duty to support, regardless of
what arrangements the parties themselves may seek to
make. 36
These opposite tendencies reflect themselves in two distinct lines of decisions. On the one side are the cases involving lump-sum settlements, or even periodic settlements
limited to a relatively short period of timeY' -Such settlements are very likely to be proscribed by the courts on the
ground that they are attempts to purchase exemption from
the duty of support, in violation of the express statute
(Domestic Relations Law § 51) forbidding such exemption.
It seems that little is necessary to undermine such a lumpsum contract. If scrutiny of the agreement indicates that it
was in any way improvident at the time made and if the wife
is presently in need, the agreement is very likely to be voided.
Indeed it may not be too much to say that such an agreement
can be attacked purely on the ground that the wife's present
reasonable needs are not being supplied, although no Court
of Appeals case seems, at least in its language, to have gone
quite that far.
On the other hand periodic payment settlements are
very difficult to attack.3 8 Such settlements may be annulled
but, questions of fraud, duress, and undue influence aside, to
achieve such annulment it is necessary to show that the
agreement was improvident when made, as well as that it
now works unfairly to the wife.8 9 Facts must be pleaded
and proved to show this inadequacy at the time of the making of the contract; however, the facts relied upon to show
36 It seems well recognized as a general proposition that the state has an
interest in the marriage contract which becomes vested at the moment the
marital status is created. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 186 Misc. 772,
62 N. Y. S. 2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Shea v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60
N. Y. S. 2d 823 (2d Dep't 1946).
37 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 7, 12, 18 and 27.
38 See, e.g., cases cited sipra notes 3, 10, 25 and 29.
39 See Dolan v. Dolan, 296 N. Y. 860, 72 N. E. 2d 603 (1947).
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this inadequacy need not be alleged with great specificity, for
a rather generalized pleading will at least survive a motion
to dismiss. 40
There is also another group of cases to be considered. If
the separation agreement is included in a court decree, then
the court will retain power over the parties to the extent that
the court can modify its own decree in respect of support
payments. 4 1 That is, once the support provisions are incorporated as part of a court decree, they are subject to modification by the court which made the decree. As a contract
between the parties, however, entirely apart from the decree,
such provisions may still retain efficacy,4" or on the other
hand, they may be deemed to have merged in the decree.
is
Under what circumstances such merger may be effectuated
43
a problem outside the scope of the present discussion.
Have these cases achieved a fair and workable rule of
law in this field? It is believed that they have. While distinction between lump-sum and periodic payment settlements
is perhaps overstressed, the distinction is not without substance. The "presumption" which the courts seem to attach
to periodic payment agreements in favor of their validity is
a recognition of the fact that such agreements provide at
least a modicum of support for the wife during her life and
thus minimize the danger of her becoming a public charge.
The lump-sum agreement, on the other hand, provides no
such assurance unless the settlement is very munificent, and
even then it may be expended imprudently by the wife within
a short space of time.
A possible weakness in the rule applied to periodic payment settlements may perhaps lie in the requirement that the
wife show improvidence at the time the agreement was made
and not merely that in the light of present circumstances it
is inadequate or incommensurate with the husband's income.
Yet, perhaps this weakness is an inevitable one if separation
40

As shown by Pomerance v. Pomerance, 301 N. Y. 254 (1950).
Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. 2d 265 (1940).
42 Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21, 38 N. E. 2d 114 (1941).
43 For a cogent analysis and a collection of the pertinent authorities on the
problem of merger of support agreements in matrimonial decrees, see TRipp,
A GUIDE wo MoTIoN PRAcrrcE § 152 (1949).
41
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agreements are to have any meaning at all. Were present
inadequacy a ground in and of itself to upset such agreements, it is certain that any separation agreement would
always be of very doubtful enforceability. It may, however,
be argued with some force, that natural justice demands that
a wife be able to attack an agreement which is presently inadequate, regardless of the fact that a rule permitting her
to do so would lend much less certainty to such agreements
and thus offend, at least to some extent, the policy of the law
in favor of final settlements of controversies outside of
court. 4" The effort of the present article is not to pass upon
the merits of such arguments, but merely to indicate the
present status of the law and the problems involved therein.
In any event, a counsel of caution should be given to all
who draw separation agreements. In fairness to both parties and in protection of both, it would seem wise, at least in
the absence of specific overriding considerations militating
against such action, to insert an "escalator" clause providing
for reduction of payments in certain fixed contingencies, such
as decreases in the husband's income ,and substantial increases in the purchasing power of the dollar, and, conversely, for increases of such payments commensurate with
increases in the husband's wages and increases in general
price levels.4 5

44 Thus one writer comments: "The rule that subsequent affluence of H
will not avail to invalidate a separation agreement has all the grace of simplicity, but may work hardship. It is best to impose some limit upon it. The
best limit is the absolute impoverishment of W. That is, even though a contract may have been fair and equitable in all respects at the date of execution,
if, through ignorance or misfortufie, W is reduced to absolute poverty, then it
is proper that H should provide for her. If H does not, then the wife will
become a public charge and the State will have to support her. As between
the State and H it is the duty of H to bear the burden." Roberts, The Validity
and Utility of SeparationAgreements in New York Law, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. Rgv.
185, 197 (1942).
45 While it may at first seem unusual to recommend insertion of an inflationdeflation clause, there seems to be no reason why such a clause cannot be satisfactorily employed, perhaps utilizing some relatively unbiased economic index,
such as that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

